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Summary:
Current controversy over antitrust
centers on goals and methods.
"Chicago School " economic analysts
seek an antitrust policy predicated
solely upon concerns of economic efficiency . Others seek to maintain a
policy intended also to protect
political and social values . Disagreements over methodology focus on the
Chicago School's primary reliance
on economic price theory to determine economic efficiency.
Supreme Court decisions reflect
these changing philosophies about
the goal of antitrust. Recent decisions relying on economic analysis
curtail or overrule earlier decisions,
particularly those of the Warren
Court. While those "rested in part on
concepts of property and contracts,
ideas derived from other parts of the
legal system , today 's decisions speak
in terms better understood by
economists. " The philosophical
incompatibility of the various opinions from which specific rules are
derived has created confusion .
' Furthermore, not all recent decisions
are based on economic premises.
" The Court has reshaped doctrine
based on economic analysis only
where there is broad consensus
among eco nomists."
Complexity and inconsistency can
also result from the tension between
current antitrust doctrine and the
political response it has evoked.
These legislative efforts are " predicated in large part on a concern over
non-economic va lu es and directed
primarily at antitrust doctrine which
is moving in the opposite direction ."
Common themes underlie all this
current controversy : antitrust has
penalized efficiency; compliance
has become unduly complex and
costly. These criticisms resemble
those directed at other forms of
economic regulation . This becomes
understandable when the paradoxical relationship between antitrust
and other econo mic regulation is
recognized.
Although " direct economic regulation and antitrust may be viewed as
alternatives," they have developed
in an interrelated fashion , and antitrust has taken on many of th e
characteristics of economic regulation . "Particularly in the period following 1930, it h as been shaped in an
increasingly regulatory fashion and
has contributed significantly to the
legalizat ion of American society."

Although antitrust is substantive ly,
procedurally and institutionally different from direct eco nomi c regulation , it "rests on the same broad
premise, namely. that government
must intervene when markets fail to
work properly ." While early antitrust rules were proscriptive , the
proliferation of antitrust statutes and
widening span uf their bans has so
narrowed the range of permissible
activities that "antitrust has become
increasingly prescriptive in practical
effect." as has economic regulation.
Insulation from the political process
has characterized bot h antitrust
doctrine , which was large ly shaped
in the courts, and economic regulation controlled by particular
agencies .
A variety of factors have dictated
these simi larities between economic
regulation and antitrust. One is the
expansion of the scope of each in the
attempt to serve more e nds .
The belief that government
process cou ld and should do better
than competitive markets at
protecting noneconomic values
developed during the depression
and is reflected in the Supreme
Court decisions of the Warren era .
"Such decisions can be perceived as
a form of economic regulation, " consciously imposing costs on business
entities to provide a cost protection
to others.
Ant itru st may be thought to sh are
the complexity characterizing
economic regulation too . " But at
least in comparative terms . antitrust
rules are not comp lex." Uncertainty,
rather than complexity, has been the
traditional problem with antitrust.
Yet the effects of this uncertainty
have all been . ironically , to increase
the regulatory effect of antitrust.
The avai la bi lit y of private ,
statutory remedy for those injured
by antitrust violations distinguishes
antitrust from other forms of
economic regulation . The mandatory
trebling of damages in these private
cases can operate as an overdeterrent. keeping firms from aggressive ly but lawfully competing.
"Firms h es itate to walk eve n close to
the line of antitru st illegality."

The constant drive by business for
more precise standards has moved
antitrust doctrine and institutions
into a more and more regulatory
posture. Judicial opinions have also
expressed concern about the lack of
precision in antitrust standards, supporting the development of the sort
of per se rules currently under attack
as unduly regulatory. Uncertainty
has also led firms to seek guidance
from government enforcement agencies. Although these agencies lack
the authority to render a binding
opinion, firms tend to respond to
their guidelines as though they were
authoritative rulings.
While antitrust doctrine may be
comparatively simple, its institutions
and procedures are complex. An
extraordinarily diverse group of actors are involved, and defendants
may be subject to an array of
remedies. Because antitrust doctrine
is not a set of rules administered by a
single agency but the result of thousands of court cases, it has been difficult to reevaluate and reform
comprehensively.
Furthermore, removing or modifying the severity of particular rules
cannot be effected through the litigation process. "Cases are brought to
enforce rules, not to 'un-enforce'
them."
The expansion of the reach of antitrust can be accounted for, in part,
by factors common to all forms of
economic regulation, factors like the
growth of protectionist ideology and
increased concern with income distribution. Yet antitrust has also
grown because of its utility as a
weapon to restrict economic regulation. The indirect challenge posed to
state government regulatory actions
by antitrust cases against those subject to such actions can be seen as
one of antitrust's major accomplishments. Yet expansion of the scope of
antitrust has been a consequence.

The final section of Professor
Kauper's paper is exerpted here. In
it he discusses the probable and
desirable outcomes of the current
demand for reevaluation of antitrust doctrine by the standard of
economic efficiency.

Excerpt:
Antitrust is but one of a number of forms of regulation,
economic and otherwise, which have contributed to the
trend toward the legalization of business decision making. It has reflected the same shifts in values, and many
of the procedural and institutional tendencies, characteristic of a variety of economic regulatory efforts.
Taken for decades as an article of faith, a faith nurtured
by a coterie of its own apostles, antitrust now finds itself
under attack in the name of reason. As our economy has
faltered, as we have lost ground to the forays of foreign
competitors both abroad and at home, faith is
being replaced by skepticism. Lawyers, the traditional
guardians of antitrust, are being displaced by
economists. The traditional modes of common law
development are, in turn, giving way to cost-benefit
analysis ....
The most fundamental issue for antitrust is, of course,
the determination of ends. Current controversies in the
courts, particularly with respect to vertical restraints and
reflected in legislative debates over such issues as the
proposed prohibition of large conglomerate mergers, are
in reality debates over ends. These controversies over
ends are directed toward the substance of antitrust rules.
... [T]he present orientation is toward an antitrust
policy focused solely on concerns of economic efficiency. This will, of itself, cause some additional substantive change. At the same time, legislative responses
to efficiency-oriented court decisions may go in precisely
the opposite direction, placing emphasis on more
populist-oriented concerns. It may well be that antitrust
will be confined to the promotion of economic efficiency
and that other rules, directed toward other ends and
bearing some name other than antitrust, will also be
enacted.
A more precise definition of goals will result, and indeed has resulted, in some doctrinal reformulation. Yet
difficult substantive issues will remain, even if it is
agreed that antitrust should concern itself only with
economic efficiency. The efficiency effects of particular
conduct must somehow be determined. In general terms,
this seems to require employment of a cost-benefit
analysis of fp.e type so strenuously urged today for the
assessment of all types of regulation. Such an analysis
could, of course, be useful even if antitrust pursues noneconomic goals as a means of telling us what we are paying to achieve them. However, while antitrust, like other
forms of regulation, ought not be comprised of rules
which are in cost-benefit terms perverse, there are
significant dangers in the insistence that all antitrust
rules and cases be measured against a precise costbenefit standard.
The costs at issue are elusive. Litigation and enforcement costs may perhaps be measured with some accuracy; but these are not the major elements of the cost
side of the equation. The major concern is whether a
given rule impairs efficiency and should therefore be
abandoned. Efficiencies, however, are peculiarly difficult to identify and quantify. The same may be said on
the benefit side, where the gain, if any, is in the promotion of allocative efficiency, the better employment of
resources.
The attempt to measure costs and benefits in the setting of particular transactions is likely to be either impossible or, at a minimum, unreliable. The focus, then, is not
on specific transactions but in the formulation of particular rules. For example, can we identify the costs and
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benefits of price fixing generally and thus arrive at a rule
dealing with price fixing? This is the approach of the
Chicago School and a number of others as well. Through
the use of price theory, it is possible to conclude at least
that some conduct will in most cases impair allocative efficiency and confer no significant productive efficiency
gains and should be prohibited. The reverse is true for
some other types of conduct. With this methodology,
relatively simple rules can be formulated and perverse
results can be avoided.
The difficulty, of course, is that there are types of conduct for which no such simple rules can be formulated,
where elaborate market, cost, price, and efficiency data
must be evaluated. Moreover, even in generalized terms,
economists may not agree on the consequences of particular conduct. If, as some have argued, antitrust rules
should prohibit only conduct on the basis of economic
consensus and cases should be brought only when a clear
efficiency gain can be predicted, inaction is the
prescribed course for a wide range of conduct.
There are justifications for such a course. If one is
prepared to accept the contention that conduct which
does not impair allocative efficiency through creation of
monopoly power must necessarily be motivated by a
predicted increase in productive efficiency, cost-benefit
decisions are not difficult and seldom need be made on a
case-by-case basis. Moreover, there is a plausible argument for a firm bias against judicial intervention except
in clear cases, giving a preference to the decision of the
firm actually in the market place unless clearly in the
wrong. Judges, after all, suffer not only the infirmities of
government decision makers generally but are confined
to a litigation process which may make judgments about
costs and benefits particularly difficult.
Yet inaction for a want of knowledge is troublesome
indeed. Room must be left for intuitive judgments, or we
are likely to see studies twenty years from now condemning failures to act on grounds that with hindsight
seem clear. Errors which permit changes in industry
structure are singularly difficult to correct. Moreover, in
the current climate there is far more emphasis on costs in
efficiency terms than on the benefits flowing from the
elimination of monopoly power. The balance tends to be
skewed.
The emphasis on the reformulation of substantive antitrust rules has tended to eclipse recognition of institutional and procedural changes which have occurred
and consideration of such changes in the future. Yet
these may be of at least equal import.
If antitrust is truly a matter of economic policy, there
are significant consequences which may be expected to
follow. The role of lawyers, and the use common law
methodology, in the formulation of doctrine, has already
been diminished, a tendency which is certain to con-•
tinue. Economists may ultimately play the dominant role,
a development which in turn may bring other institutional changes.
Traditionally, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has characterized itself as a "law
enforcement" agency. In bureaucratic terms, this has
given the Division a degree of insulation from not only
the most obvious forms of political interference but from
the influence of other agencies, and the Congress, in
policy terms. If all the Division does is "enforce the law,"
there is little basis for policy judgments and, thus, little
basis for coordination of such judgments with others. But
as the Division and the courts cast antitrust in economic
policy terms, and as the Division utilizes ~ broad-based
competition policy derived from the antitrust laws to
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enhance its deregulation efforts, its protective insulation
may break down. Antitrust policies may ultimately need
to be coordinated with monetary policy, and so on. It
will, in short, be more difficult to assert that antitrust
must reflect only competitive concerns, even though that
is what Congress intended. The Division, then, must
develop and rely on its own economic expertise if it is
not to be subordinated to the views of others. Antitrust
policy will remain its domain only if it possesses the
greatest expertise in the development of such policy.
A similar impact may be felt by the courts. Economic
policy decisions as such have seldom been left to the
judiciary, which is outside the mainstream of political influence and accountability and utilizes a litigation
process which may not be the most efficient or reliable
means of determining economic "facts." At a minimum,
the litigation process itself may need significant alteration if it is to adapt to the new emphasis on economic
analysis in anti trust cases ....
Finally, a complete reassessment of antitrust sanctions
is needed. The criminal, civil, and treble damage provisions of the antitrust statutes have been amended
periodically, but not at the same time. The sanction
structure needs to be considered as a whole, with particular emphasis on the treble damage remedy, which is
virtually unique to antitrust. ...
Central to these questions is the more basic question of
whether we want to encourage private antitrust actions
at all .... There are alternatives. A single civil penalty
action brought by the government could replace both
criminal and private damage remedies. Victims could be
compensated from the fund, if such compensation is
thought necessary ....
I began by declining to address the role of antitrust as a
deregulator, a role which is perhaps its most important.
It is relatively a limited role. Courts applying antitrust
rules on a case-by-case basis cannot be expected to ignore clear antitrust exemptions, or dismantle existing,
pervasive regulatory schemes. Within these confines,
however, antitrust litigation can define the outer limits
of economic regulation and confine antitrust exemptions
to a relatively narrow scope. The effect of such Ii ligation,
moreover, may be to force legislative reconsideration of
existing regulatory patterns and, in the process, to consider anew the possibility of relying more heavily on
market forces as the ultimate regulator.
Antitrust, then, can be utilized to force legislative
bodies to think anew about the utility of economic
regulation .... Antitrust litigation is a crude way of
provoking legislative action, but it has worked. It has also
been successful as an educational device, providing a
forum in which competition can be presented as a
realistic alterna live to regulation. In the long run, significant deregulation can come only through legislative action. Antitrust has a major role to play in forcing and informing such action-a role it can perform more effectively once its own house is in order.

